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THE BRAVE NEW WORLD OF LONG-TERM CAREt
STEPHEN

A.

MOSES

Thank you for inviting me to Notre Dame Law School. It is
an honor to address you and to share the podium with such distinguished co-presenters.
My background includes eighteen years as a career U.S. government employee and a decade working with Medicaid and
long-term care issues for the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) and the Department of Health and Human Services
(DHHS) Office of Inspector General. I am currently president
of the Center for Long-Term Care Reform, a private think tank
and public policy advocacy organization dedicated to ensuring
quality long-term care for all Americans.
I chose "The Brave New World of Long-Term Care" as my
topic today, but let me start by describing the "Pusillanimous Old
World of Long-Term Care," that is, the status quo. America has a
welfare-financed, institution-based long-term care system, in the
wealthiest country in the world, but no one wants to go to a nursing home. Long-term care in the United States is characterized
by access and quality problems,1 dismally low reimbursement
levels, 2 discrimination against public benefits recipients,' institutional bias, 4 loss of independence, welfare stigma,' and imminent
t On November 9, 2005, the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public
Policy hosted a symposium entitled "Long-Term Care for America's Elderly:
Who is Responsible, and How Will it Be Achieved?". Stephen Moses was the
fourth speaker at the Symposium. His remarks have been revised for
publication.
1.

See

GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NURSING HOME QUALITY.: PREVALENCE OF

SERIOUS PROBLEMS, WHILE DECLINING, REINFORCES IMPORTANCE OF ENHANCED

OVERSIGHT (2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03561.pdf.

2. For a more complete discussion of the effects of reimbursement levels
on quality of care, see COMM. ON IMPROVING QUALITY IN LONG-TERM CARE, INST.
MEDICINE, IMPROVING THE

QUALITY OF LONG-TERM

CARE 235-47 (Gooloo S.

Wunderlich & Peter 0. Kohler eds., 2001).
3. See Stephen A. Moses, Aging America's Achilles' Heel: Medicaid Long-Term
Care, in POLICY ANALYSIS No. 549 (The Cato Institute, POLICY ANALYSIS No. 549,

2005), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa549.pdf.
4. See ENID KASSNER, AARP, & LEE SHIREY, NAT'L AcAD. ON

AN AGING

SOC'Y, MEDICAID FINANCIAL ELIGIBILITY FOR OLDER PEOPLE: STATE VARIATIONS IN

ACCESS TO HOME AND COMMUNITY-BASED WAIVER AND NURSING HOME SERVICES

12 (2000), available at http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/health/2000-06-medicaid.pdf.
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insolvency.6 Most Americans do not worry about long-term care
until they need it. Consequently, few save, invest, or insure for
the risk of needing long-term care, and they usually end up on
public assistance. 7
How in the world did we get into this mess? The U.S. Government started paying for nursing home care, in 1965, through
Medicaid 8 and Medicare.9 Its good intentions had unanticipated
and extremely unfortunate consequences. Because nursing
home care was free, institutionalization predominated, and
home and community-based care languished for decades.1 0
Since the government paid for nursing home care, no one
bought private insurance to cover such long-term care." Costs,
of course, exploded, as they always do when a benefit is free to
consumers. 12

5. See Janice Cooper Pasaba & Alison Barnes, Public-PrivatePartnerships
and Long-Term Care: Time for a Re-Examination?, 26 STETSON L. REV. 529, 555,
n.150 (1996) (discussing welfare stigma as a possible motivation for buying
long-term care insurance).
6. But see Moses, supra note 3, at 2-7 (detailing ways in which elderly people may shift their assets in order to avoid "spend-down" and still qualify for
Medicare and Medicaid).
7. Out-of-pocket costs were estimated to make up only 33% of total longterm care for the elderly spending in 2004, and private long-term care insurance was estimated to cover 4% of such total costs. In contrast, Medicare and
Medicaid were estimated to cover a combined 60% of total long-term care costs.
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, U.S. CONG., FINANCING LONG-TERM CARE FOR THE ELD-

3 Fig.1-1 (2004), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/54xx/doc5400/
04-26-LongTermCare.pdf.
8. See Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2000). For a detailed explanation of Medicaid-a topic too complicated for the purposes of this speechsee Moses, supra note 3, and www.centerltc.com.
9. See Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2000).
10. In 2005, there were 1.46 million people living in nursing facilities.
ARi HOUSER, WENDY Fox-GRAGE & MARY Jo GIBSON, AARP PUB. POLICY INST.,
ACROSS THE STATES: PROFILES OF LONG-TERM CARE AND INDEPENDENT LIVING 10
(2006), available at http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/health/d18763_2006_ats.
pdf.
11. In 2001, less than 10% of seniors had purchased long-term care insurance. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, LONG-TERM CARE: BABY BooM GENERATION
INCREASES CHALLENGE OF FINANCING NEEDED SERVICES 11 (2001) (statement of
William J. Scanlon before the U.S. Senate Committee on Finance), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01563t.pdf.
12. See HOUSER ET AL., supra note 10, at 10 ("Medicaid spent $94.5 billion
on long-term care services in 2005, which means that roughly one-third (31%)
of total Medicaid expenditures of $300 billion went toward long-term care.").
In addition, Medicaid is the largest item in state budgets. See NAT'L ASS'N OF
STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, 2003 STATE EXPENDITURE REPORT 8 Tbl., 3 (2003),
availableat http://www.nasbo.org/Publications/PDFs/2003ExpendReport.pdf.
ERLY
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To control costs, Medicaid tried to contain expenses by paying too little for this long-term care, thus causing access and quality problems. 1" When that did not control costs, the government
tried to restrict access to Medicaid by making eligibility harder to
achieve, requiring recovery from recipients' estates, and
criminalizing the transferring of assets in order to qualify or
penalizing financial advisors who, for a fee, rendered the advice
to make such asset-transfers.' 4
Those measures failed because Medicaid eligibility rules are
generous to begin with and so elastic that they are easily
stretched to cover even affluent people. How can that be-when
Medicaid long-term care eligibility requires being impoverished?
Simple-it doesn't: There is no limit on how much income people can have, as long as their medical expenses, including private
nursing home care, are high enough.'" There is no limit on
assets, either, as long as they are held in exempt form, such as a
home,1 6 business,' 7 automobile, 8 prepaid burial expenses, 9
13. See Moses, supra note 3,at 8 (quoting sources to illustrate Medicaid's
"dismal reputation for problems of access, quality, reimbursement, discrimination, and institutional bias").
14. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-7b(a) (2006) (criminalizing the act of advising
persons to make false statements or representations related to federal health
care programs when a fee is charged for such advice); see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396p(b) (4) (2007) (defining "estate" in the context of mandatory recovery
to the state of any medical assistance paid on behalf of an individual under a
state plan).
15. There is no set limit on how much income you can have and still
qualify as long as your private medical expenses are high enough or, if you live
in an "income cap" state, you have a Miller income diversion trust. All anyone
needs to qualify for Medicaid is a cash-flow problem-that is, too little income
after all medical expenses are deducted. See Moses, supra note 3, at 3 (explaining that a Miller income trust enables an individual, with income surpassing a
specified limit, to qualify for Medicaid, benefit from Medicaid's low reimbursement rates, and take advantage of additional medical services).
16. See U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin., Program Operations Manual System: SI
01130.100 The Home, https://s044a90.ssa.gov/appslO/poms.nsf/lnx/050113
0100 (last visited Apr. 18, 2007) (stating "[an individual's home, regardless of
value, is an excluded resource").
17. See U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin., Program Operations Manual System: SI
01130.501 Essential Property Excluded Regardless of Value or Rate of Return,
(last visited Apr.
https://s044a90.ssa.gov/appslO/poms.nsf/lnx/0501130501
18, 2007) (stating "[p]roperty essential to self-support used in a trade or business is excluded from resources regardless of value or rate of return . . .").
18. See U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin., Program Operations Manual System: SI
01130.200 Automobiles and Other Vehicles Used For Transportation, https://
s044a90.ssa.gov/appsIO/poms.nsf/lnx/0501130200 (last visited Apr. 18, 2007)
(stating "[o]ne automobile per household is excluded regardless of the value if
it is used for transportation of the eligible individual/couple or a member of
the eligible individual's/couple's household).
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term life insurance,2" home furnishings and other personal
belongings, etc.2 1 The bottom line is that most elderly people
who have the need for a nursing home level of care qualify for
Medicaid. Lawyers and other advisors who specialize in artifican easily qualify people far above
cially "impoverishing people"
22
the already generous levels.
After over forty years of publicly financed long-term care,
consumers are anesthetized to the high risk and catastrophic
costs of such care because the government pays for the vast
majority of all long-term care in the United States. 23 Amy Finkelstein and Jeffrey Brown have confirmed this fact in two papers:
They found that two-thirds to ninety percent of the potential
market for private long-term care insurance has been crowded
out by Medicaid. 24 The key point is that Medicaid and Medicare
took on too much of the burden of long-term care financing and
distorted the market, impeding the development of home-based
and community-based care infrastructures and discouraging private insurance to pay for25it. Both programs are now spiraling
toward financial collapse.
19. See U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin., Program Operations Manual System: SI
01130.400 Burial Spaces, https://sO44a90.ssa.gov/appslO/poms.nsf/lnx/0501
130400 (last visited Apr. 18, 2007) ("A burial space or agreement which represents the purchase of a burial space held for the burial of the individual, his or
her spouse, or any other member of his or her immediate family is an excluded
resource, regardless of value.").
20. See U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin., Program Operations Manual System: SI
01130.300 Life Insurance, https://s044a90.ssa.gov/appslO/poms.nsf/lnx/0501
130300 (last visited Apr. 18, 2007).
21. See U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin., Program Operations Manual System: SI
01130.430 Household Goods, Personal Effects, and Other Personal Property,
https://s044a90.ssa.gov/appslo/poms.nsf/lnx/0501130430 (last visited Apr.
18, 2007) (excluding household goods and personal effects as resources when
deciding whether a person is eligible to receive Supplemental Security Income
benefits).
22. See Moses, supranote 3, at 3-6 (providing examples of common strategies used to manipulate assets in order to qualify for Medicaid and citing
sources explaining those methods).
23. Id. at 7 ("The fundamental problem with [long-term care] financing
is that government pays for so much of it that the public has been anesthetized
to the risk and expense of high-cost extended care.").
24. See Jeffrey R. Brown, Norma B. Coe & Amy Finkelstein, Medicaid
Crowd-Out of Private Long-Term Insurance Demand: Evidence from the
Health and Retirement Survey (2007), http://www.aeaweb.org/annual-mtg_
papers/2007/01071300_0701.pdf. This report is among those for the 2007
American Economic Association Annual Meeting.
25. Moses, supra note 3, at 1 (stating that "[s]eventy-seven million aging
baby boomers will sink America's retirement security system" if action is not
taken soon, that "Medicare is [a great] problem, with $60 trillion in unac-
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The good news is that if we stop doing what we have always
done, we will get a different result. After all, isn't that the very
definition of "sanity"? If the current problems of long-term care
have been caused by excessive dependency on public financing,
the solution is clear: Target Medicaid to the truly needy, and
others
will plan early to save, invest, or insure for long-term
26
care.

That is finally starting to happen. The Deficit Reduction Act
(DRA) of 200527 took several baby steps in that direction. Before
the DRA, anyone could shelter unlimited assets in a home and
contiguous property. 28 Now, there is a cap on home equity of
$500,000 (or $750,000 at a state's discretion)29 With the average
home equity in America only $86,000o that's only a start. But
keep in mind, Britain, with its socialized health care system, only
allows people $36,000 of home equity while receiving publicly
financed long-term care.3 1
The DRA also extended the look-back period, for asset transfers done to qualify for Medicaid, to five years. 2 This is also just
a start, as the average period of time from the onset of
Alzheimer's Disease to death is eight years,3 3 and Medicaid planners are already urging people to begin much earlier to plan for
public welfare. 34 In Germany, another European socialized system, the look-back period for asset transfers is ten years, that is,
double ours. 35 Ironically, America's long-term care system is far
counted-for obligations, and that Medicaid is a welfare program that "bears
scrutiny but receives much less attention").
26. Moses, supra note 3, at 14 (See the conclusion for a more detailed

explanation of this statement.).
27.

Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4 (This

Act is codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. and 20 U.S.C.).
28. See supra note 22.
29.
30.

See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p (2000).
NAT'L INST. ON AGING, U.S. DEP'T. HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., & U.S.
CENSUS BuREAu, U.S. DEP'T. COMMERCE, 65+ IN THE UNITED STATES (2005),
http://www.census.gov/prod/2006pubs/p23-209.pdf.
31. See Stephen A. Moses, President, Center for Long-Term Care
Reform, Testimony Presented to the Small Business Roundtable on The Future
of Long-Term Care and Medicaid (July 10, 2006) (transcript available at http:/
/www.centerltc.com/speakers/testimony071006.htm).
32. See Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, tit. 6, ch. 2, subch. A, § 6011, 120
Stat. 4 (2006) (lengthening look-back period and changing the beginning date
for period of ineligibility).
33.

See B.C. Jost, et al., The Natural History of Alzheimer's Disease: A Brain

Bank Study, 43J. Am.GERIATRICS Soc'y 1248 (1995) (The total disease duration
for this typical Alzheimer's patient is just over 101 months, or approximately 8.5

years.).
34.
35.

See, e.g., Moses, supra note 31.

See id.
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more generously available than are some of the ostensibly socialized systems in Europe.
The DRA is further effective by changing the penalty period
regarding asset transfers done to qualify for Medicaid in order to
eliminate the half-a-loaf strategy, which was the single most common technique used to impoverish people artificially for Medicaid. 6 Critics have claimed that imposing the asset transfer
penalty later than before will deny care to people actually in
need of care, but that won't happen.
Why? Because we have
eliminated the main reason to transfer assets in the first place.
However, even if someone, in need of care but penniless and
ineligible for Medicaid, does accidentally end up penalized for
transferring assets, the DRA strengthened the provisions for
undue hardship waivers in order to protect such people.3 8
The DRA also blocked several other abuses previously used
to divert people, who should have paid their own way for longterm care, to Medicaid. There are more restrictions on the use
of annuities to convert countable, disqualifying assets into nondisqualifying income. 39 The "income first" rule has replaced the
"asset first" option, thus preventing huge extra asset exemptions
for community spouses.4' I have described these and other provisions of the Deficit Reduction Act that bear on Medicaid eligibility in testimony before Congress.4 1
Finally, the DRA did two other critical things related to longterm care. Long-term care partnerships may now be expanded
to all states.4 2 That's nice but not decisive. The partnerships
allow people who buy long-term care insurance to exempt extra
assets from Medicaid spend-down.4 So, if there is no real spenddown requirement as in the past, the partnerships have, and
36. See Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Title VI, ch. 2, subch. A, § 6011 (b),
120 Stat. 4 (2006) (changing the dates of the penalty periods regarding asset
transfer rules).
37. See generally Amy Fagan, AARP Ads Fight Medicaid Changes, THE WASHINGTON TIMES, Dec. 5, 2005, available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/
national/20051204-113549-6448r.htm.
38. See Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Title VI, ch. 2, subch. A,
§ 6011(d)-(e), 120 Stat. 4 (2006) (discussing the availability of hardship
waivers).
39. See Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Title VI, ch. 2, subch. A, §§.
6012-6014 (2006).
40. Id.

41.
42.

See Moses, supra note 31.
See Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Title VI, ch. 2, subch. B, § 6021

(discussing state long-term care partnership programs).
43. Id.
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indeed they have had in the four states that have tried them
already, little effect.4 4
The last key thing the DRA did was to unleash Medicaid to
pay for more home and community-based services ("HCBS")
instead of nursing home care.4 5 States will no longer have to
obtain waivers to cover HCBS; they can do so under their regular
Medicaid state plans.4 6 This is a double-edged sword, however,
unless states also control the hemorrhage in Medicaid eligibility.
HCBS and assisted living are popular services that everyone
wants. When private long-term care insurance started paying for
them, costs and premiums exploded. The government is about
to learn the same bitter lesson.47
The Deficit Reduction Act, with its constraints on Medicaid
long-term care eligibility and its encouragement of personal
responsibility through private insurance and home equity conversion, is definitely the direction in which we must move. When
we target Medicaid's scarce resources to the genuinely needy,
those needy will get better care across a wider spectrum of services. When more people pay privately for long-term care, they
will command red-carpet access to top-quality care at the most
appropriate level of care. When people with money have to pay
for their own long-term care, they will buy long-term care insurance and use their home equity, which means those businesses
will boom, provide more jobs, and pay more taxes. When longterm care providers have more private payers, nursing homes,
assisted living facilities, and all other caregivers will be more
financially solvent. Debt and equity capital, which are desperately needed to finance the construction and operation of longterm care facilities, will return to the marketplace.
44. See Moses, supra note 31 ("Studies conducted of the partnerships programs in the four original states indicate that they helped expand the long-term
care insurance market on the margin, but they hardly made a qualitative difference as compared to the market for the product in other, non-partnership
states.").
45. See id. (discussing the advantages of the DRA provisions that expand
Medicaid-funded home and community-based services).
46. JEFFREY S. CROWLEY, HEALTH POLICY INSTITUTE, GEORGETOWN UNIVERsITY, MEDICAID LONG-TERM SERVICES REFORMS IN THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT 2

(2006) (This brief was published by the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation
Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured.), http://www.kff.org/medicaid/
upload/7486.pdf.
47.

U.S.

GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, THE ELDERLY SHOULD BENEFIT FROM

EXPANDED HOME

HEALTH CARE

BUT INCREASING THOSE

SERVICES WILL NOT

INSURE COST REDUCTIONS (1982), http://archive.gao.gov/f0102/120074.pdf
(discussing how research and past experiences indicate that offering additional
services will not necessarily bring cost reductions).
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Finally, what is wrong with other proposals commonly
offered to solve this problem? Many seek to solve the problems
of long-term care service delivery and financing with compulsion.
They want to force people to pay for long-term care insurance or
load up Medicare with a long-term care benefit.4 8 That won't
work, and it hasn't worked. If excessive public financing has
caused the problems we have now, then trying to solve them by
adding more government financing would be like trying to put
out a fire by dousing it with gasoline. Social Security and Medicare have unfunded liabilities totaling $86 trillion, at latest
count.49 To fix this, we would have to double payroll taxes or
halve the benefits of these programs. Neither option is politically
popular. The more likely outcome is that these programs will be
means-tested. In other words, they will be turned into welfare
programs. In time, they will lose political support in the same
way Medicaid already has. Adding long-term care to Medicare,
therefore, would be like adding deck chairs to the Titanic after
the incident with the iceberg.
Here is the irony: our problems in long-term care are selfinflicted by well-intentioned but perversely counterproductive
public policy. The good news is that the problems are easy to fix.
We can do it responsibly through public policy, or we can just
stand by and let the existing social insurance and welfare house
of cards collapse. The Brave New World of Long-Term Care is
here.
My advice to you as individuals, families, and citizens is to
take responsibility for your own long-term care. Plan early, and
save, invest, or insure. Maybe you can't solve the public policy
problem alone, but you can protect yourselves and your families.
Doing so is an important contribution. After all, as a wag once
said: "The best way to help the poor is not to become one of
them."5 o
Politically, my advice to you is to support targeting Medicaid
to the poor, in order to save the fraying safety net, and supplementing long-term care with private financing sources. Do you
wonder how the new Democratic majority in Congress will lean?
Remember: some of the most stringent controls on Medicaid
48. See generally Richard L. Kaplan, Cracking the Conundrum: Toward a
Rational Financing of Long-Term Care, 2004 U. ILL. L. REv. 47 (2004).

49. OFFICE OF ECON. POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, SOCIAL SECURITY
AND MEDICARE TRUST FUNDS AND THE FEDERAL BUDGET 18 (2006), http://www.
ustreas.gov/offices/economic-policy/reports/budget-trustifund-perspectives2006.pdf.
50. See, e.g., Quotations - Laing Hancock, http://thinkexist.com/quotes/
lainghancock (quoting Laing Hancock).
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long-term care eligibility in the past came under Democratic
presidents and Congresses. 1 Besides, for Democrats, this is a
"fairness" issue. Why use scarce public resources to indemnify
well-to-do heirs of affluent seniors? They're probably all Republicans anyway!
Thank you for your attention.

51. See generally, Colleen Grogan & Eric Patashnik, Between Welfare Medicine
and MainstreamEntitlement: Medicaid at the Political Crossroads, 28 J. HEALTH POL.

& L. 821 (2003) (discussing various enactments of Medicaid policies and
controls over the 1980s and 1990s).
POL'Y

